Topics in Computing for Society
CSE 290T: Topics in Computing for Society
Game Theory & Applications in Computer Science & Engineering
Announcements:
On Tuesday April 9, the lecture will be delivered via Zoom. This is because the instructor needs to be out of town. You should plan to attend remotely and use the following Zoom link.
https://ucsc.zoom.us/j/92464133769?pwd=d0g4bUJzK2JUNzUvai9iWGRUUHZjZz09
Instructor
John Musacchio
Office: E2-557
johnm@soe.ucsc.edu
Lectures
Tuesdays & Thursdays 11:40 AM - 1:15 PM
McHenry Lib 1350
Description
This course covers the fundamentals of game-theory with a focus on game-theory's connections to computer science and engineering. These connections go in both directions. For example, computer science complexity theory sheds light on whether equilibria concepts from game-theory are plausible predictions of behavior by assessing whether computing an equilibrium is a tractable problem. Game-theory informs computer science about how the incentives of different users and/or stake holders of a computing system can lead to undesirable outcomes (e.g. poor utility across users, congestion, systems with serious security vulnerabilities...) It also provides a framework for analyzing the performance of various kinds of distributed systems, such as networks like the internet whose congestion is managed by end-to-end rate control. We will also study mechanism design -- how games can be designed to achieve more desirable outcomes. Mechanism design has many applications in computing and engineered systems, such as the creation of markets of advertising on the internet (which has been a multibillion dollar market for over a decade), markets to allocate radio spectrum with complicated interference constraints, and markets for electricity.
The course uses game-theory textbooks, like the classic Game Theory textbook by MIT economist Drew Fudenberg and Nobel Laureate Jean Tirole, as well as key papers for more in-depth study of particular computer science to game-theory connections. We will also make extensive use of a compiled book titled Algorithmic Game Theory that has contributed chapters from many of the leading thought leaders on the connections between game theory and computer science.
Reading Material (Tentative)
Books:
[AGT ’07] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E ́. Tardos, & V. Vazirani, ed., Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 29-51.
Acquisition: FREE ONLINE: [link] -Then click on "Algorithmic Game Theory": -Then click on "Algorithmic Game Theory": Or buy a hard copy on Amazon: [link] (~$72 new, ~$50 used)
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Other Readings:
[Akerlof '70] G. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 1970, 488-500. [Arrow '50] K. Arrow, ”A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare,” The Journal of Political Economy 58(4), 1950, 328-346. [A & M '10] L. Ausubel & P. Milgrom, “The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction.” in Combi- natorial Auctions, edited by P. Crampton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg, MIT Press, 2010, 17-40. [DL & M '17] Dritsoula, P. Loiseau, and J. Musacchio, “A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Adver- sarial Classification,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 12(12), 2017, 3094-3109. [EO & S `07] B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, M. Schwarz, “Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords,” American Economic Review, 97(1), 2007, 242-259. [MS & W '09] J. Musacchio, G. Schwartz, & J. Walrand, “A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Provider Investment Incentives with an Application to the Net Neutrality Issue,” Review of Network Economics, 8(1), 2009, 22-39. [Parkes '10] D. Parkes, “Iterative Combinatorial Auctions.” in Combinatorial Auctions, edited by P. Crampton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg, MIT Press, 2010, 17-40. [Varian ’04] H. Varian, “System Reliability and Free Riding”, in Economics of Information Security, Kluwer, 2004, 1-15. |
[H '17] J. Hespanha, Noncooperative Game Theory: An Introduction for Engineers and Computer Scientists, Princeton University Press, 2017. Acquisition Optional: Amazon: [link] |
Lecture Log
Lect# | Date | day | notes | topics | readings | |
1 | April 2 | Tu | slides |
Strategic Form Games
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Fudenberg and Tirole Chapter 1 | |
2 | April 4 | Th | slides notes |
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3 |
April 9 |
Tu | notes recording |
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4 | April 11 | Th | notes |
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Zero_Sum_Games_Note | |
5 | April 16 | Tu | notes |
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[DL&M ’17] | |
6 | April 18 | Th | notes |
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[AGT Papadimitriou] | |
7 | April 23 | Tu | note matlab_script |
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8 | April 25 | Th | notes | Games with continuous strategy spaces: Bertrand, Public Goods by Means of Lotteries | ||
9 | April 30 | Tu | notes | Selfish Routing | [AGT Roughgarden] | |
10 | May 2 | Th | slides |
Selfish Traffic and Link Pricing with Elastic Traffic, |
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11 | May 7 | Tu |
Backward induction in continuous games, Stackelberg Competition, Strategic Commitment, Net Neutrality Model |
[MS&W ’08] | ||
12 | May 9 | Th |
Asymmetric Information, Signaling Games, Market for Lemons |
[Akerlof '70] | ||
13 | May 14 | Tu |
First and Second Price Auctions, Nonlinear pricing |
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14 | May 16 | Th |
Nonlinear Pricing, Revelation Principle, VCG, VCG examples, optimal mechanisms |
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15 | May 21 | Tu |
Optimal Mechanisms, Arrow Impossibility Theorem |
[Arrow 1950] | ||
16 | May 23 | Th |
Games on Graphs |
S. Goyal, Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks, 2007. | ||
17 | May 28 | Tu |
Games on Random Graphs, Botnet Detection Game |
B. Soper & J. Musacchio, "Botnet Detection Game", Allerton 2014. | ||
18 | May 30 | Th |
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Lecture Plan (Tentative)
Lect # |
Date | Day | notes | Assignments | Topics | Reading |
1 | April 2 | Tu | slides | assignment 1 out |
Strategic Form Games
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Fudenberg and Tirole Chapter 1 and 2.1 |
2 | April 4 | Th | ||||
3 |
April 9 |
Tu |
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4 | April 11 | Th | assignment 1 due | |||
5 | April 16 | Tu |
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6 | April 18 | Th | ||||
7 | April 23 | Tu |
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8 | April 25 | Th | ||||
9 | April 30 | Tu |
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10 | May 2 | Th | MIDTERM | |||
11 | May 7 | Tu |
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12 | May 9 | Th | ||||
13 | May 14 | Tu |
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14 | May 16 | Th | ||||
15 | May 21 | Tu |
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16 | May 23 | Th | ||||
17 | May 28 | Tu |
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18 | May 30 | Th | ||||
19 | June 4 | Tu |
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20 | June 6 | Th | ||||
June 13 | Th | FINAL EXAM 8-11 am |
Assessment
• Assignments 30%
• Project 25%
• Midterm 20%
• Final 25%
Course Summary:
Date | Details | Due |
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