Topics in Computing for Society

CSE 290T:  Topics in Computing for Society

Game Theory & Applications in Computer Science & Engineering

Announcements:

On Tuesday April 9, the lecture will be delivered via Zoom. This is because the instructor needs to be out of town. You should plan to attend remotely and use the following Zoom link.
https://ucsc.zoom.us/j/92464133769?pwd=d0g4bUJzK2JUNzUvai9iWGRUUHZjZz09

Instructor

John Musacchio
Office: E2-557
johnm@soe.ucsc.edu

Lectures

Tuesdays & Thursdays 11:40 AM - 1:15 PM
McHenry Lib 1350

Description

This course covers the fundamentals of game-theory with a focus on game-theory's connections to computer science and engineering. These connections go in both directions. For example, computer science complexity theory sheds light on whether equilibria concepts from game-theory are plausible predictions of behavior by assessing whether computing an equilibrium is a tractable problem. Game-theory informs computer science about how the incentives of different users and/or stake holders of a computing system can lead to undesirable outcomes (e.g. poor utility across users, congestion, systems with serious security vulnerabilities...)  It also provides a framework for analyzing the performance of various kinds of distributed systems, such as networks like the internet whose congestion is managed by end-to-end rate control. We will also study mechanism design -- how games can be designed to achieve more desirable outcomes. Mechanism design has many applications in computing and engineered systems, such as the creation of markets of advertising on the internet (which has been a multibillion dollar market for over a decade), markets to allocate radio spectrum with complicated interference constraints, and markets for electricity.

The course uses game-theory textbooks, like the classic Game Theory textbook by MIT economist Drew Fudenberg and Nobel Laureate Jean Tirole, as well as key papers for more in-depth study of particular computer science to game-theory connections. We will also make extensive use of a compiled book titled Algorithmic Game Theory that has contributed chapters from many of the leading thought leaders on the connections between game theory and computer science.

Reading Material (Tentative)

Books:

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[AGT ’07] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E ́. Tardos, & V. Vazirani, ed., Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 29-51.
      Specific contributed chapters:

      • [AGT Papadimitriou] C. Papadimitriou, “The Complexity of Finding Nash Equilibria,” 29-51.
      • [AGT Vazirani] V. Vazirani, “Combinatorial Algorithms for Market Equilibria,” 103-134.
      • [AGT T&W] E ́. Tardos and T Wexler, “Network Formation Games and the Potential Function Method,” 487-516.
      • [AGT Roughgarden] T. Roughgarden, “Routing Games,”  461-486.

Acquisition: FREE ONLINE: [link]
-Click in this under the book picture: image.png

-Then click on "Algorithmic Game Theory": image.png

-Then click on "Algorithmic Game Theory": image.png

Or buy a hard copy on Amazon: [link] (~$72 new, ~$50 used)

 

image.png

[F & T '91] D. Fudenberg & J. Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991.

Acquisition: Buy on Amazon: [link] (~$74 Hardcover or Kindle, ~$40 paper back)
UCSC Library Online access: [link] (Only one student at a time)

Other Readings:

[Akerlof '70] G. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 1970, 488-500.

[Arrow '50] K. Arrow, ”A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare,” The Journal of Political Economy 58(4), 1950, 328-346.

[A & M '10] L. Ausubel & P. Milgrom, “The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction.” in Combi- natorial Auctions, edited by P. Crampton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg, MIT Press, 2010, 17-40.

[DL & M '17] Dritsoula, P. Loiseau, and J. Musacchio, “A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Adver- sarial Classification,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 12(12), 2017, 3094-3109.

[EO & S `07] B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, M. Schwarz, “Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords,” American Economic Review, 97(1), 2007, 242-259.

[MS & W '09] J. Musacchio, G. Schwartz, & J. Walrand, “A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Provider Investment Incentives with an Application to the Net Neutrality Issue,” Review of Network Economics, 8(1), 2009, 22-39.

[Parkes '10] D. Parkes, “Iterative Combinatorial Auctions.” in Combinatorial Auctions, edited by P. Crampton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg, MIT Press, 2010, 17-40.

[Varian ’04] H. Varian, “System Reliability and Free Riding”, in Economics of Information Security, Kluwer, 2004, 1-15.

Extra Readings:
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[H '17] J. Hespanha, Noncooperative Game Theory: An Introduction for Engineers and Computer Scientists, Princeton University Press, 2017.

Acquisition Optional: Amazon: [link]

Lecture Log

Lect#  Date day notes topics readings
1 April 2 Tu slides

Strategic Form Games

  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Nash Existence Theorem
  • Brouwer and Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem
  • Iterated Strict Dominance
Fudenberg and Tirole Chapter 1 
2 April 4 Th slides
notes
3

April 9
Via Zoom
[link]

Tu notes
recording
  • Nash Existence Theorem
  • Zero-Sum Games, Duality
4 April 11 Th notes
  • Nash Existence Theorem
  • Zero-Sum Games, Duality
Zero_Sum_Games_Note
5 April 16 Tu notes
  • Zero-Sum Games, Duality
  • Detection Games
[DL&M ’17]
6 April 18 Th notes
  • Complexity of Finding Nash Equilibria in Finite Games 
[AGT Papadimitriou]
7 April 23 Tu note
matlab_script
8 April 25 Th notes Games with continuous strategy spaces: Bertrand, Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
9 April 30 Tu notes Selfish Routing [AGT Roughgarden]
10 May 2 Th slides

Selfish Traffic and Link Pricing with Elastic Traffic,
Extensive Form Games

11 May 7 Tu

notes
slides

Backward induction in continuous games, Stackelberg Competition, Strategic Commitment, Net Neutrality Model

[MS&W ’08]
12 May 9 Th

notes

Asymmetric Information, Signaling Games, Market for Lemons

[Akerlof '70]
13

 

 

 

 

 

Lecture Plan (Tentative)

Lect

#

Date Day notes Assignments Topics Reading
1 April 2 Tu slides assignment 1 out

Strategic Form Games

  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Nash Existence Theorem
  • Brouwer and Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem
  • Iterated Strict Dominance
Fudenberg and Tirole Chapter 1 and 2.1
2 April 4 Th
3

April 9
Via Zoom
[link]

Tu
  • Zero-Sum Games, connection to LP duality
  • Security Games [Varian ’04]
    • Blotto Games
    • Detection Games [DL&M ’17]
4 April 11 Th assignment 1 due
5 April 16 Tu
  • Complexity of Finding Nash Equilibria in Finite Games [AGT Papadimitriou]
6 April 18 Th
7 April 23 Tu
  • Nash Equilibria in Games with Continuous Strategy Spaces
    • Cournot and Bertrand Competition
    • Congestion Games [AGT Roughgarden]
      • Efficiency Loss / “Price of Anarchy”
8 April 25 Th
9 April 30 Tu
  • Markets and Social Choice [F&T ’91, Arrow ’50]
    • Arrow-Debreu Markets
    • Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem [Arrow ’50]
    • Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics
10 May 2 Th MIDTERM
11 May 7 Tu
  • Extensive Form Games
    • Two Sided Markets [MS&W ’08]
12 May 9 Th
13 May 14 Tu
  • Bayesian Games
    • Asymmetric Information / Market for Lemons [Akerlof '70]
    • First Price Auction with Private Values
14 May 16 Th
15 May 21 Tu
  • Mechanism Design [F&T ’91]
    • Revelation Principle
    • Revenue Equivalence Theorem
    • Vickrey Auction [A&M ’10]
    • Optimal Auctions / Myerson Mechanisms
16 May 23 Th
17 May 28 Tu
  • Sponsored Search Auctions [EO&S ’07]
  • Combinatorial Auctions [Parkes ’10]
18 May 30 Th
19 June 4 Tu
  • Games on Graphs
    • Network Formation [AGT T&W]
    • Contagion Games
20 June 6 Th
June 13 Th FINAL EXAM 8-11 am

Assessment

Assignments 30%
Project 25%
Midterm 20%
Final 25%

Course Summary:

Date Details Due